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Despite souring relations, the EU should avoid the temptation
to further disengage with Belarus and enhance its policy of
critical engagement.
by Blog Admin
Considered by many to be Europe’s ‘last dictatorship’ under President Alexander Lukashenka,
Belarus’s relations with the EU have been in decline for several years, despite initiatives such
as the Eastern Partnership. Giselle Bosse  warns that instead of disengaging, the EU should
continue its policy of critical engagement with the country by building the capacity of Belarusian
civil society and being more realistic and specific about its policy goals.
Af ter several years of  gradual rapprochement and pragmatic engagement, EU-Belarus
relations hit rock bottom af ter rigged presidential elections in December 2010 and the
subsequent violent crackdown of  opposition protests by the Belarusian regime. Relations worsened in 2011
and 2012, when the EU extended its sanctions on the regime and key economic actors. The Organization
f or Security and Co-operation in Europe also judged September’s parliamentary elections as neither f ree
nor f air. Not surprisingly, the EU’s institutions and member states have become increasingly f rustrated with
the regime in Belarus, which is of ten described as the ‘last dictatorship’ in Europe. Neither isolation, nor the
new ‘crit ical engagement’ policy with Belarus under the Eastern Partnership (EaP) launched in 2009 (an EU
init iative aimed at developing closer relations with the countries of  Europe’s east) appear to have had any
impact on the government of  President Lukashenka. Yet, at the same time, the country’s managed economy
depends more than ever on Russia to provide loans, subsidize energy supplies, and grant access to the
regional market.
In light of  these developments, there is
a real possibility that the EU will
f urther disengage with Belarus, or
simply put relations with the country
on the polit ical backburner until
sometime bef ore the next presidential
elections in 2015. That scenario,
however, seems the least desirable f or
the EU. The (already limited) leverage
over the regime would f urther
decrease and disengagement is likely
to impact negatively on the (already
decreasing) support f or the EU among
the Belarusian population. Instead of
f urther disengagement, the EU should
improve the ef f ectiveness of  its crit ical
engagement policy with Belarus.
Even though crit ical engagement did
not yield any signif icant results in terms of  democratic ref orm in the short term, it is important to remember
that the policy was based on the idea of gradual change through engagement, which is essentially a long
term strategy. And indeed, there is much sense in the words of  Swedish f oreign minister Carl Bildt, who
argued early on in the EaP process that it was rather overoptimistic to expect that the EU would achieve
democracy in Belarus by ‘next Wednesday’. Given that overall context, crit ical engagement did also have
several posit ive ef f ects. First, it generated an unprecedented interest in Belarus within the EU, and with it a
greater awareness and understanding of  the country among EU of f icials. Second, that awareness f urther
increased dialogue with the Belarusian government, and with civil society at large. Third, the engagement
generated additional f unds f or projects (albeit still very limited in scale and reach) which raised the prof ile
of  the EU. Fourth, the EaP Civil Society Forum enabled Belarusian civil society to network more
systematically (although the polit ical inf luence of  the CSF as such is negligible). Fif th, Lukashenka did
introduce some ref orms, though these mainly concerned legislation pertaining to f oreign investments.
Nevertheless, there are several reasons to assume that the EU is likely to move towards a policy of
disengagement with Belarus. First, the EU’s current f inancial crisis means that the EU will become more
inward- looking in the next f ew years, and f inancial assistance f or external relations will decrease (or at
best stay at its current level). At an average of  €28 million per year, EU f inancial assistance to Belarus is
very limited, and incomparable to the large-scale loans that the country receives f rom Russia (or China)
which exceed several billions of  dollars. Second, the EU’s f oreign policy agenda will continue to be
dominated by events in its southern neighbourhood (Syria, Arab Spring countries), which has already led to
decreased levels of  interest in the Eastern Partnership this year. Third and as already hinted at earlier in
this text, the EU’s leverage over Belarus vis-à-vis Russia is decreasing. Apart f rom the dependence on
Russian loans and energy resources, Belarus has recently joined the Single Economic Space (SES) with
Russia and Kazakhstan, and is likely to come under signif icant pressure f rom Russia to f urther integrate
into the Eurasian Economic Community (or even a Eurasian Economic Union by 2015).
In my policy paper on ‘The EU and Belarus: perpetual tango all over again?’ f or the European Policy Centre
(24 September 2012) I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of  the EU’s crit ical engagement policy
towards Belarus, and its current two-pronged approach based on targeted sanctions against the
Belarusian authorit ies on the one hand, while trying to intensif y dialogue with, and support f or, civil society
and cit izens on the other. Taking into account the geopolit ics and geo-economics of  Russia’s relations with
Belarus (and with the EU), expectations of  what the EU can achieve in Belarus should be lowered. Lower
expectations should, however, not lead to disinterest or disengagement. Instead, I argue in f avour of  a
continuation of  the EU’s policy of  crit ical engagement and outline f ive measures to improve the current
policy:
1. The EU should continue to place the individuals directly involved on its visa blacklist. Sanctions
should only be applied more generally if  the EU establishes clear criteria regarding which actions
count as support f or the regime and which do not.
2. Member states and EU institutions should not circumvent their own sanction regimes, such as the
purchase of  dual-use equipment f or border assistance projects.
3. The EU should strategically target and develop the capacity of  civil society over a sustained period
of  t ime. The Civil Society Facility (which aims to strengthen the capacity of  non-state actors) should
f unction as a top-up of  existing programmes, not as a means of  disguising f unding reductions f or
existing programmes.
4. There is no automatic guarantee that the EU’s engagement with the Belarusian authorit ies will lead to
the movement of  of cials towards democracy. However, if  the EU does place greater emphasis on
building the capacity of  Belarusian public administration in 2012/13, ef f orts should be made to
implement meaningf ul assistance projects.
5. The EU could be more specic about the goals of  its policy. Are the sanctions meant to ‘punish’
particular individuals f or human rights violations, to ‘annoy Lukashenka’, or simply to signal that the
EU ‘is doing something’ about autocratic regimes in its neighbourhood? And what is the longer term
goal: to push Lukashenka to introduce ref orms, or regime change?
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